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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

)
Respondent,

vs.
AUGUST SCHREIBER,

\

Case No.

~

7737

Defendant and Appellant. }

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO
ADDITIONAL POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES SUBMITTED
BY RESPONDENT

The respondent submitted certain authorities in a
supplement to its brief on the morning the case was argued
before the court on appeal. At that time the Court granted
appellant leave to file a reply to those additional authorities
within ten days.
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ARGUMENT
Respondent's additional authorities were submitted in
support of its contention that the statute (Section 105-3617, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended), pursuant to
which the trial court made its October 20, 1949 order, was
violative of Article Seven, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The following facts and circumstances of record
must be recalled for a proper consideration of the said
contention.
At the time the October 20, 1949 order was made and
entered by the court the defendant and appellant was not a
prisoner in the state penitentiary, but rather was on probation under a previous order of the court suspending sentence; the defendant had been on probation for several
months and had complied fully with the conditions of his
probation. A favorable report was made by his probation
officer. It is significant to note that the trial court did not
base its order of June 9, 1951, upon the unconstitutionality
of the statute, but affirmatively stated that it deemed the
statute to be constitutional. No claim has been made at
any time herein that the order suspending sentence and
placing defendant on probation was invalid. No claim has
been made that termination of probation and discharge of
defendant was not found to be compatible with the public
interest.
It is appellant's position that respondent misconceives
the nature of the order of October 20, 1949, and the statute
pursuant to which the order was made. The statute and
order do not transgress the pardoning power embraced
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within the constitutional provision. Both the statute and
the order pertain to the exercise of an inherent judicial function, the power of a court to suspend sentence and place
a defendant on probation, to designate the period of probation and to subsequently terminate the probation and discharge the defendant where the conditions of the probation have been fulfilled and where such action be compatible
with the public interest. There is a vital distinction which
must be drawn between the power to pardon on one hand
and the power to suspend sentence and place a defendant
on probation and subsequently terminate the probation and
discharge the defendant on the other hand. This distinction was recognized by courts long before either the Federal Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Utah
was adopted and was unquestionably recognized by the
framers of said constitutions.
15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Section 481.
The great weight of authority is to the effect that a
statute authorizing a court to suspend sentence for reasons
compatible with the public interest and to place a defendant
on probation, controlling in its discretion the period of
probation, does not do violence to constitutional provisions
vesting the pardoning power in the executive department of
the government.
Annotation, 26 A. L. R. 400,
Annotation, 101 A. L. R. 1402.
The statute, pursuant to which the October 20, 1949
order was made, must be read and studied as a whole to
appreciate its purpose and effect. This statute does nothing
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more nor less than to confer upon the courts the power to
suspend sentence, place a defendant on probation and to
subsequently terminate the probation and discharge the
defendant and dismiss the action when the probation requirements have been satisfied. The statute does not give the
courts an independent power to dismiss an action after a
defendant has been committed to the state penitentiary and
has commenced to serve the term of his sentence ; nor was
the order of October 20, 1949, made and entered upon such
circumstances. The defendant had been placed on probation; good reason was shown to the court why the period
of probation should be shortened and, pursuant to that, the
court, by its order, discharged defendant from the further
supervision of the parole department and dismissed the
action.
Certainly, if a court has the power to suspend sentence
and place a defendant on probation for a period determined
in its good discretion, the court has the incidental power to
discharge a defendant and dismiss the action and close the
case by an order of dismissal when finally the court deems
that the probation requirements have been satisfied. The
essential question is, therefore, whether the power which the
statute gives to the courts to suspend sentence and place
a defendant on probation for a period determined by the
court is constitutional; the power to ultimately conclude
the matter by an order of discharge and dismissal is incidental to that.
The said Utah statute was originally enacted in the
Laws of 1923, page 144, section 1. Prior to that time there
was some doubt as to the power of a court to indefinitely
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suspend sentence. In re FUnt, 25 Utah 338, 71 Pac. 531.
Since the enactment of the said statute this Court has had
frequent occasion to consider it. State v. Z olantakis, 70
Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044; Ex Parte Follett, ... Utah ... ,
225 P. (2d) 16; Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.
(2d) ·640. In the above mentioned cases this Court considered at length the provisions of the Utah statute relating
to the power of the courts to suspend sentence and place
a defendant on probation. In none of those cases has the
Court questioned the constitutionality of the statute. Impliedly at least, the Court has held in those cases that the
said provisions are constitutional.

·-

Appellant submits, therefore, that the order of October
20, 1949, was simply an incidental part of the power given
to the court by the statute to suspend sentence and place
the defendant on probation for a period determined in the
discretion of the court. If the provision in the statute providing for the ultimate disposition of a probation is invalid,
the whole statute is invalid. However, appellant submits
that the statute is constitutional, because it vests in the
courts a power which is inherently judicial, the power to
suspend sentence, place on probation and ultimately terminate the probation and discharge the defendant where in the
court's discretion the probation conditions have been fulfilled and the action is compatible with the public interest.

It seems hardly necessary to say that the power embraced in the statute is one which is widely and frequently
exercised by both State courts and Federal courts. It has as
its purpose the reformation of convicted persons without
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the detriment of imprisonment. Few, if any, authorities on
criminal rehabilitation and reform would question its wisdom.
Respectfully submitted,

GRANT MACFARLANE,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
LEONARD J. LEWIS,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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